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Abstract 
This paper is an assessment of the employment effects of the Missouri Quality Jobs 
Program, which awards tax credits to businesses so as to spur state job creation.  
According to the Missouri Department of Economic Development, which adminsters the 
program, the tax credits rewarded under the program have, created more than 10,000 new 
jobs, so far, and will generate a net increase of more than 50,000 jobs by 2020.  My 
estimates indicate, however, that the program simply transfers jobs to subsidized projects 
from the rest of the economy, while also creating labor-market distortions.  My baseline 
estimates indicate that there were about 5,000 fewer private-sector jobs in Missouri in 
2011 because of the program.  Alternative estimates suggest even larger job losses.  The 
most-likely best-case scenario for the long run is that the hundreds of millions of dollars 
transferred to businesses under the program will have led to no net change in state 
employment.
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I. Introduction 
 This paper examines the effectiveness of state development tax credits in generating 
employment gains.  Specifically, it estimates the employment effects of the Missouri Quality 
Jobs Program (MQJP), the declared purpose of which is to “(f)acilitate the creation of quality 
jobs by targeted business projects” by awarding tax credits in support of qualifying projects.  Tax 
credit programs such as the MQJP are quite common around the country and are touted by state 
economic development agencies as important components of their development efforts.  
Nonetheless, there is little evidence that targeted tax credits and similar policies are effective in 
spurring economic development and employment (Wall, 2011).  In fact, two recent studies of 
employment tax credits in Michigan found that the state’s MEGA tax credits were sometimes 
responsible for losses in overall employment (LaFaive and Hicks, 2011; LaFaive and Hohman, 
2009).
1
   
 In their survey of the academic literature on targeted development policies such as state 
tax credits, Peters and Fisher (2004) concluded that (1) there is little-to-no evidence that these 
policies lead to significant new investment or jobs; (2) much of the benefit of the policies go to 
people who live elsewhere, especially when they are targeted at distressed areas; and (3) alleged 
gains to tax-revenue are illusory because any revenue gains from subsidized firms or areas will 
simply be offset by revenue lost from elsewhere in the economy.  Bartik (2005) also found only 
modest evidence that they had had much of an effect, although he attributed their failure to the 
tendency to use them where they are needed the least rather to unsound theoretical 
underpinnings. 
 For development tax credits to work there must be some market failures, such as 
imperfect capital markets or agglomeration economies, that create a gap between the actual and 
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 Bartik and Erickcek (2010) dispute these results. 
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efficient levels of local employment.  If there are such market failures, the argument goes, then 
there might be room for a properly structured program that would use state money to direct 
resources to close these employment gaps.  Broadly speaking, therefore, if a tax credit program 
fails to deliver on promised jobs, it was either because market failures were not significant drags 
on employment, or because the program was not structured properly.  On the heels of the 
programs’ aforementioned history of failure, significant improvements have been made in how 
they are structured.
2
  Specifically, recent incarnations of state tax credit programs are designed 
with much greater accountability to ensure a closer link between promised and realized new jobs 
at firms receiving the tax credits.   
 In many respects, the MQJP has been ahead of the curve in terms of accountability in that 
it includes provisions for cancelling tax credits in the event that job-creation thresholds are not 
met, which it did for 33 projects in 2012.
3
  In addition, despite the extremely weak national 
economy following the launch of the MQJP, Missouri has so far maintained program 
accountability, thereby bucking the tendency for governments to erode accountability during 
difficult economic times (Zheng and Warner, 2010).
4
  Given its relatively sound structure, 
therefore, the success or failure of the MQJP in delivering on employment creation is likely 
attributable to the extent to which it is based on solid economic efficiency grounds rather than on 
the soundness of its administration. 
 
                                                 
2
 See Zheng and Warner (2010) for a nice discussion of trends in the types of policies employed and the reasons the 
policies have persisted despite the lack of evidence of their effectiveness. 
3
 By 2009, only 23.1 percent of local governments included such clawbacks in their programs (Warner and Zheng, 
2013). 
4
 I should note that the Missouri state auditor issued a report chastising the state’s Department of Economic 
Development over its administration of the MQJP (http://www.auditor.mo.gov/Press/2012-65.pdf).  Most of the 
report had to do with the methods used to calculate job gains at recipient firms, which is largely beside the point in 
determining the actual effectiveness of the program. 
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2. The Program and Its Promises 
 Tax credits have been awarded under the MQJP since 2006 and are distributed under 
three business sub-categories—small/expanding, technology, and high-impact—each with its 
own set of eligibility criteria and program benefits.
5
  By 2012, the number and total value of tax-
credit authorizations were both more than double their 2006 levels, although this trend was 
interrupted a great deal by the national recession of 2008-09 (Figure 2).
6
  The increase in the 
anticipated number of new jobs at recipient firms roughly doubled between 2006 and 2012, 
although, as shown in Figure 3, the number of actual new jobs is, so far, well short of what had 
been anticipated when the credits were authorized.  Obviously, the lag between the date of 
authorization and the actualization of new jobs accounts for most of the shortfall for 2010-12, but 
even credits authorized in 2006-08 have fallen well short of their promise.  Perhaps the credits 
from those years would look more successful if it weren’t for the recession of 2008-09. 
 The most recent claims made by the Missouri Department of Economic Development 
(DED) about the direct effects (new jobs at firms that were awarded tax credits) and indirect 
effects (spinoff jobs and multiplier effects) of the MQJP are contained in the program’s 2012 
annual report.
7
  At the end of 2012, there were 220 active supported projects, 73 of which were 
newly authorized in 2012.
8
  The DED claims that projects authorized through 2011 were directly 
responsible for 10,137 actual new jobs by the end of 2012—with more to come as the projects 
progress—and that the 73 new projects are anticipated to directly generate another 7,054 new 
jobs in five years time.  After plugging their estimates of direct job growth into their forecasting 
                                                 
5
 The Missouri Department of Economic Development has a very useful summary of the program online 
(http://www.ded.mo.gov/BCS%20Programs/BCSProgramDetails.aspx?BCSProgramID=76).  
6
 These numbers are summed across the three sub-programs and include all authorizations that were not disqualified. 
7
 Missouri Quality Jobs Annual Report 2012 (http://ded.mo.gov/upload/2012annualreport.pdf).  
8
 Note that some projects approved in prior years are removed from the list of active projects because they do not 
meet or maintain the requirements of the program.  In 2012, for example, 33 projects had their program approval 
rescinded. 
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model, DED arrives at the claim that the tax credits awarded through 2012 will have created 
50,096 jobs (directly and indirectly) by 2020, or 118 jobs for each million dollars in tax credits.   
 There are a number of reasons to doubt the DED’s claims about the effects of the MQJP.  
With regard to direct job creation, the DED is being naïve, or perhaps narcissistic, in assuming 
that the supported projects exist only because of the MQJP tax credits, and that all of the 
anticipated new jobs will end up as actual new jobs.  These assumptions fly in the face of the 
evidence.
9
  Perhaps even more absurd is how the DED presumes that none of the new jobs are 
filled by workers who were already employed elsewhere in Missouri.
10
  As for the broader 
indirect effects, the DOD relies on the belief that the reshuffling of employment that occurs 
between subsidized and unsubsidized firms must be greatly outweighed by large spinoff and 
multiplier effects.  This belief is embedded into the DED’s forecasting model which, despite a 
veneer of quantitative detachment, is simply a mathematical specification of the DED’s prior 
beliefs about how the economy works.  More precisely, the primary sources of the indirect gains 
predicted by DED’s REMI forecasting model are illusive multiplier effects that the DED 
believes will dominate the substitution effects across firms and communities (Mills, 1993).  This 
notion is, to say the least, extremely controversial among economists in that regional forecasting 
models are afflicted with many of the same problems as the outdated national forecasting models 
from the 1960s and 1970s on which they are based.
11
   
 Because the MQJP has been in place for several years, it is no longer necessary to rely on 
the DED’s dubious claims about the future effects of the program.  It is instead possible to 
                                                 
9
 See Gabe and Kraybill (2002) for the experience in Ohio, and Faulk (2002) for the experience in Georgia. 
10
 Nationally, about one-third of all new jobs in the United States are filled by job switchers and there are large 
differences in job-switching rates across industries (Hyatt and McEntarfer, 2012). 
11
 As summarized by Rickman (2010), regional forecasting models “suffer from the Lucas critique, equation 
parameters may be unstable over time, and their lack of deep structure confounds interpretation of estimated 
parameters.” 
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compare actual employment outcomes against those promised by its supporters, which is the 
objective of the present paper.  Below, in Section 3, I specify the empirical model that I use to 
estimate the effects of the MQJP on Missouri employment.  The empirical results are presented 
in section 4, and are used to calculate aggregate employment effects in section 5.  Section 6 
concludes. 
 
3. Empirical Model 
 As a practical matter, it is not possible to trace the various employment effects of a tax 
credit authorization back their source, so it is necessary to instead look at aggregate employment.  
Also, because state-level data would not be terribly informative given that it would only provide 
several observations, I use county-level data with the objective of detecting statistical patterns 
between levels of county employment and the amount of tax credits that counties received.  My 
data set uses annual private employment for 1998-2011 for all counties in Missouri from the 
Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns.  It is a balanced panel of 114 counties in which the 
independent city of St. Louis is included as a county and Worth County is excluded because of 
missing data.  Tax credit data are converted to 2011 dollars using the CPI deflator from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and include all tax credits that were authorized, including those that 
were subsequently canceled for failing to meet the program’s performance criteria. 
 My primary interest is in deviations from baseline employment that are due to the effects 
of tax credits, which can affect employment over many years and have different effects over 
time.  To account for this, the specification allows for employment in a given year to be related 
to the value of the tax credit awarded during that year and during each of the previous five years 
(which, given the data set, is the maximum lag).  Analogous variables are also included to 
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capture the effects of tax credits received by neighboring counties.  To eliminate the effects of 
fluctuations in employment due to the business cycle, my dependent variable is county-level 
shares of state employment.  To control for changes in county employment shares that are 
unrelated to the MQJP, I assume that each county has its own quadratic trend.  Note that my 
estimates look at the net effects of tax credits and do not distinguish between direct, indirect, 
spinoff, or multiplier effects. 
 The effectiveness of tax credits might differ a great deal on the extent to which the labor 
markets in neighboring counties are integrated with one another.  Many Missouri counties are 
part of larger economically integrated entities: 17 are in one of two large metropolitan statistical 
areas (MSAs), another 17 are in one of six small MSAs, and ten are in micropolitan areas (μSAs) 
with more than one county.  Counties within these entities are, by definition, economically 
integrated, so I account for the possibility that tax credits have different effects on them than on 
nonmetro counties.  Finally, the specification also accounts for border effects to control for the 
fact that Missouri’s two large MSAs contain substantial areas in other states and that 46 of 
Missouri’s counties are on the state border.   
 Given the considerations outlined above, I specify Eit, county i’s relative employment at 
time t as  
.)(
)(
5
0
5
0
2
210
it
j
jitijijijj
j
jitijijijj
iiiit
NBLS
CBLS
ttE
 
 




         (1) 
In (1), Cit is the real amount of tax credits authorized for firms in county i in year t and Nit is the 
corresponding measure for county i’s neighbors.  To differentiate the effects of tax credits across 
types of counties, there are three interaction dummies for each of Cit and Nit:  Si equals one if the 
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county is in a small MSA or a μSA composed of more than one county, Li equals one if the 
county is in one of the state’s two large MSAs, and Bi equals one if the county borders another 
state.  The possible lags in the effects of tax credits are captured by including the levels of tax 
credits over a six-year period, with the year of authorization denoted as j = 0.  Because (1) 
includes lags in the effects of tax credits, and because of the wide disparity in employment shares 
across counties, the estimation allows for autocorrelated errors and is corrected for 
heteroskedasticity, respectively.  To obtain estimates with these corrections, I estimate 
expression (1) using Feasible Generalized Least Squares.   
 
4. Estimation Results 
 The estimation results for the unrestricted version of equation (1) are provided in Table 1, 
which, for space considerations, does not include the estimates of the 228 county-level trend 
coefficients or the 114 county-specific intercepts.  A set of alternative results under various 
restrictions on the interaction terms in (1) are provided in the appendix.  It should be noted at the 
outset that all of the estimated effects for the fifth year after authorization are based on very few 
observations: Only nine counties received tax credits in 2006, so there are only nine observations 
of the effects of tax credits in the fifth year after authorization.  For the most part, therefore, 
these estimates can be safely ignored, although they need to be obtained to guard against 
estimation bias. 
 The effects in the first column of Table 1 are for a baseline county that is not in a metro 
area and does not border another state.  For these counties, tax credits have positive and 
statistically significant effects on employment in the year of authorization through the third year 
after authorization.  In subsequent years, however, the effects are statistically no different from 
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zero.  In contrast, employment in non-metro counties tends to be reduced by the tax credits 
received by neighboring counties.  The neighbor effects for the fourth and fifth year after 
authorization are not statistically significant, however.   
 Figure 3 illustrates the effects of one million dollars in tax credits on a non-metro county 
and its neighbors.  To calculate the effects illustrated by Figure 3, recall that county employment 
is measured as a fraction of state employment and note that over the period 2006-11 a percentage 
point of employment was, on average, 22,232 jobs.  The marginal effect of one million dollars of 
tax credits is, therefore, 22,232 times the estimated coefficient for the relevant variable.  Also 
note that the neighbor effects reported in Table 1 indicate the marginal effects of neighbors’ tax 
credits on only one county, so the full effect on neighbors is the relevant coefficient times 3.42, 
the average number of neighbors for counties that received tax credits.  For the year of 
authorization and the following three years, the effects on a county and its neighbors are 
statistically significant although, as is apparent from the figure, the large positive effects on the 
recipient county is usually cancelled out by roughly comparable job losses in neighboring 
counties.  The solid line in the figure represents the net employment effect for each year, and is 
small and positive for three of them, rising to 45 jobs by the third year after authorization.  By 
the fourth year after authorization neither the recipient county nor its neighbors see a statistically 
significant effect on employment because of the tax credits. 
 It’s not possible to know the precise sources of the job gains and losses illustrated in 
Figure 3 because they include the direct gains at recipient firms, substitution effects on other 
firms, and spinoff and multiplier effects.  The results do, however, illustrate that one county’s 
gains are likely at the expense of other local economies, and not by attracting workers out of 
unemployment or by generating large multiplier effects.  The importance of these cross-county 
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effects is highlighted further by the large and statistically significant negative neighbor effects 
for counties in μSAs and small MSAs.   
 The closer integration of counties in μSAs and small MSAs mean that the negative 
effects of tax credits on a county’s neighbors are significantly larger than are illustrated in Figure 
3.  During the authorization year and the year following it, a county within a small metro area 
tends to see an additional boost in employment when firms in one of its neighbors receive tax 
credits.  Perhaps this is because the entire metro area is participating in construction-related 
activities for the supported projects.  Subsequently, however, the neighbor sees increasingly 
large negative effects that are in addition to the non-metro neighbor effects already described.  In 
contrast, there is little additional neighbor effect when the county is in a large MSA other than in 
the year after authorization.  Perhaps this should be expected because the smallness of μSAs and 
MSAs means that neighbor effects will be more obvious statistically.  That is, the metro-area 
neighbor effect might be highly diluted in large metro areas such as Kansas City and St. Louis, 
which have 16 and 17 counties, respectively. 
 
5. Adding it up 
 To get an idea of the effects of a tax credit authorization over its life cycle, I applied the 
marginal effects described in the previous section to the tax credits that were authorized through 
2011.
12
  I then aggregated the estimated effects on 2011 employment according to the year in 
which the credits were authorized and whether the credits were received by a county or by its 
neighbors.  The total effects in terms of employment per million dollars of tax credits are 
illustrated by Figure 4.  The figure shows the own effects, the neighbor effects, and the net 
effects by the number of years since the tax credits were authorized. 
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 I used only the coefficients that were statistically significant at the 10 percent level or better. 
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 According to the estimates summarized by Figure 4, tax credits led to a net increase in 
state employment only during the year of authorization and the following year.  Specifically, in 
the year of authorization, tax credits led to 128 more jobs per $1 million in the recipient counties, 
but a loss of 110 jobs per $1 million in neighboring counties.  In the year following 
authorization, recipient counties and their neighbors tended to see increased employment: 249 
and 82 jobs per $1 million, respectively.  Beyond this initial start-up period, however, job gains 
in the recipient counties tended to have been more than cancelled out by job losses in 
neighboring counties: The net effects were losses of 42 and 50 jobs per $1 million in tax credits 
during the second and third years after authorization.  By the fourth year after authorization, 
there were no statistically significant effects on the recipient counties’ employment, but 
neighbors tended to have lost 85 jobs per $1 million in tax credits. 
  If the employment effects illustrated in Figure 4 are aggregated, the estimated net 
employment effect of the MQJP on Missouri employment in 2011 is a loss of 16 jobs per $1 
million dollars of tax credit authorized between 2007 and 2011.  Put another way, in 2011, there 
were 5,379 fewer jobs in Missouri because of the MQJP.  Note, however, that this estimate is 
arrived at by using only those estimated marginal effects that were statistically significant at the 
10 percent level or better.  Although standard, this significance level is nonetheless arbitrary, so 
it is worth examining how the estimates would differ under a couple of alternative standards.  
The various alternatives are presented in Table 2. 
 The middle row of Table 2 breaks down the estimates discussed above of the effects of 
the MQJP on Missouri private employment in 2011: Using only those coefficients from Table 1 
that are statistically significant at the 10 percent level or better, the MQJP increased the level of 
employment in counties receiving tax credits by 36,454, but decreased private employment in 
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neighboring counties by 41,833.  If we tighten the statistical significance standard to include only 
those estimates that are significant at the 5 percent level or better, the program looks much 
worse: It led to 19,613 more jobs in recipient counties but 44,034 fewer jobs in neighboring 
counties, meaning that in 2011 there were 23,237 fewer private sector jobs in Missouri because 
of the program.  Alternatively, if we ignore statistical significance and use all of the point 
estimates, the MQJP led to 27,923 more jobs in recipient counties, but 40,900 fewer jobs in 
neighboring counties, or just under 13,000 fewer jobs statewide. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 The MQJP has been in place long enough to obtain statistical evidence of its effects on 
the communities with firms receiving tax credits under the program.  Under a variety of 
assumptions, I find that counties receiving tax credits under the program tended to see increases 
in employment for a few years, but that these effects were not sustained beyond three years.  
Also, the increased employment in recipient counties tended to be at the expense of neighboring 
counties.  Overall, my baseline estimate is that there were 5,379 fewer private-sector jobs in 
Missouri in 2011 because of the MQJP.   
 It is important to remember that my estimate of the net effect of the MQJP on 
employment is aggregated across tax credits of different vintages and that the effects differ by 
the amount of time since tax credits are authorized (Figure 4).  In the short run—the first two 
years—tax credits are associated with job gains in the recipient county and its neighbors.  Over 
the medium run (the next two years), however, the recipient county gains employment only at 
the expense of its neighbors, and there is a net loss of jobs.  At the beginning of the long run—
the fourth year after authorization—there are no longer any signficant job gains in the recipient 
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county, but the market distortions created by the tax credits mean that there are still significant 
job losses in neighboring counties.  It’s not possible given the data available to estimate what 
happens beyond this early stage of the long run, but it is difficult to imagine that the trend 
reverses enough to come close to the DED’s projection of 118 new jobs per million dollars of tax 
credits.  The more-likely best-case scenario is that the employment distortions eventually work 
themselves out and the net effect of of the tax credits approximates zero.   
 Finally, there are many possible avenues through which the effects of a tax credit will 
permeate through the rest of the economy.  As such, each individual tax-credit authorization will 
have its own set of effects, depending on the local and industrial characteristics of the recipient 
county.  My estimates are of the average effects of tax credits, so it is entirely possible that some 
of the specific projects that have received support under the MQJP have had net positive effects.  
It is probably not possible at this stage to know which of the projects might worked.  At any rate, 
it is extremely difficult to square the large negative effects that the MQJP has so far had on 
employment with the DED’s prediction that by 2020 the program will have created tens of 
thousands of jobs that otherwise wouldn’t have existed. 
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Appendix: Alternative Specifications 
 Equation (1) allows for a variety of employment effects in addition to those on the 
counties receiving tax credits: (i) neighbor effects, (ii) metro effects, and (iii) border effects.  As 
reported in Table 1, each of these categories had at least one statistically significant coefficient, 
so each also had a role in determining the estimates of the total effects of the MQJP summarized 
in Table 2.  The purpose of this appendix is to test alternative specifications that restrict the 
effects of these categories to zero.  The results of three restricted estimations, each of which 
excludes one category of variables, are summarized in Table A. 
 The first restricted model assumes that there are no neighbor effects and this restriction 
has little effect on the rest of the estimates, even though neighbor effects were found to be 
statistically significant in the unrestricted estimation.  This result is readily apparent from a 
comparison of Table 1 to Table A and indicates there was no localized spatial correlation in the 
allocation of tax credits under the program.  The second set of restricted results show the 
statistical importance of including metro effects to avoid biasing the estimates of the rest of the 
model.  Specifically, the positive and statistically significant effects of counties’ own credits for 
the year of authorization and the third year following authorization would not be obtained, and 
the coefficients on the neighbor effects would be reduced by one third to one half.  Finally, even 
though only one of the border coefficients in the unrestricted estimation was statistically 
significant, if it were assumed that the effect of being on the border was zero, the positive effect 
found for counties’ own tax credits would be reduced for all years of authorization that are 
statistically significant in the unrestricted estimation.   
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Table A. Alternative Estimation Results: Dependent Variable = County Relative Employment 
 No Neighbor Effects No Metro Area Effects No Border Effects 
 Non-Metro Small Metro Large Metro Border Non-Metro Border Non-Metro Small Metro Large Metro 
Effects of Own Credits θ0,…,θ5 ω0,…,ω5 λ0,…,λ5 κ0,…,κ5 θ0,…,θ5 κ0,…,κ5 θ0,…,θ5 ω0,…,ω5 λ0,…,λ5 
  Authorization year 0.0045 * -0.0047  -0.0018  -0.0056  0.0025 -0.0041  0.0023  -0.0057  -0.0042  
 (0.0021) (0.0053) (0.0042) (0.0035) (0.0021) (0.0055) (0.0015) (0.0068) (0.0061)  
  Year after authorization 0.0092 * 0.0073  -0.0094 † -0.0055  0.0091 * -0.0057  0.0073 * 0.0065  -0.0116  
 (0.0030) (0.0101) (0.0055) (0.0046) (0.0029) (0.0067) (0.0021) (0.0104) (0.0077)  
  Second year after authorization 0.0067 † 0.0042  -0.0077  -0.0048  0.0062 † -0.0015  0.0055 * 0.0011  -0.0051  
 (0.0035) (0.0134) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0035) (0.0080) (0.0024) (0.0140) (0.0079)  
  Third year after authorization 0.0096 * -0.0242  -0.0013  -0.0113  0.0043  -0.0031  0.0056 † -0.0228  -0.0042  
 (0.0044) (0.0159) (0.0072) (0.0069) (0.0043) (0.0092) (0.0031) (0.0158) (0.0096)  
  Fourth year after authorization 0.0045  -0.0164  -0.0025  -0.0086  0.0044  0.0012  0.0033  -0.0177  -0.0005  
 (0.0043) (0.0162) (0.0079) (0.0083) (0.0043) (0.0111) (0.0035) (0.0161) (0.0104)  
  Fifth year after authorization -0.0094  -0.1112  0.0072  0.0129  0.0066  0.0116  0.0195  -0.1359  -0.0123  
 (0.0625) (0.1358) (0.0623) (0.0144) (0.0068) (0.0149) (0.0649) (0.1369) (0.0660)  
Effects of Neighbors’ Credits       γ0,…,γ5 π0,…,π5 γ0,…,γ5 δ0,…,δ5 υ0,…,υ5 
  Authorization year        -0.0005 * 0.0018  -0.0012 * 0.0023 * 0.0021  
        (0.0002) (0.0019) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0018)  
  Year after authorization        -0.0007 * 0.0042 † -0.0020 * 0.0016  0.0029  
        (0.0003) (0.0023) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0022) 
  Second year after authorization        -0.0010 * 0.0004  -0.0022 * -0.0033 * 0.0013  
        (0.0003) (0.0028) (0.0004) (0.0014) (0.0030) 
  Third year after authorization        -0.0016 * 0.0021  -0.0022 * -0.0065 * 0.0022  
        (0.0004) (0.0033) (0.0005) (0.0016) (0.0033) 
  Fourth year after authorization        -0.0003  -0.0043  -0.0003  -0.0087 * -0.0027  
        (0.0004) (0.0043) (0.0005) (0.0016) (0.0044) 
  Fifth year after authorization        -0.0006  -0.0008  -0.0028 † 0.0308 * 0.0012  
        (0.0010) (0.0061) (0.0017) (0.0102) (0.0061) 
The estimation includes county fixed effects and county-specific quadratic trends, which are not reported here. Estimation is performed using Feasible Generalized Least Squares with 
corrections for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Statistical significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels are indicated by “*” and “†”, respectively. Data are annual for 114 Missouri 
counties covering 1998-2011. 
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Table 1. Base Estimation Results: Dependent Variable = County Relative Employment 
 Non-Metro Small Metro Large Metro Border  
Effects of Own Credits θ0,…,θ5 ω0,…,ω5 λ0,…,λ5 κ0,…,κ5 
  Authorization year 0.0046 * -0.0082   -0.0017   -0.0056   
 (0.0020)  (0.0068)  (0.0053)  (0.0036)  
  First year after authorization 0.0090 * 0.0049   -0.0091   -0.0047   
 (0.0028)  (0.0104)  (0.0068)  (0.0047)  
  Second year after authorization 0.0062 † 0.0011   -0.0048   -0.0036   
 (0.0034)  (0.0139)  (0.0070)  (0.0058)  
  Third year after authorization 0.0099 * -0.0259 † 0.0008   -0.0114   
 (0.0043)  (0.0157)  (0.0087)  (0.0073)  
  Fourth year after authorization 0.0050   -0.0181   -0.0011   -0.0078   
 (0.0042)  (0.0160)  (0.0098)  (0.0088)  
  Fifth year after authorization -0.0014   -0.1152   -0.0005   0.0165   
 (0.0659)  (0.1371)  (0.0655)  (0.0166)  
Effects of Neighbors’ Credits γ0,…,γ5 δ0,…,δ5 υ0,…,υ5 π0,…,π5 
  Authorization year -0.0013 * 0.0024 * 0.0000   0.0020   
 (0.0003)  (0.0007) (0.0010)  (0.0017)  
  First year after authorization -0.0023 * 0.0017 † 0.0030 * 0.0044 * 
 (0.0004)  (0.0010) (0.0011)  (0.0021)  
  Second year after authorization -0.0022 * -0.0034 * 0.0001   0.0016   
 (0.0005)  (0.0014) (0.0018)  (0.0025)  
  Third year after authorization -0.0023 * -0.0065 * 0.0027   0.0026   
 (0.0006)  (0.0017) (0.0022)  (0.0030)  
  Fourth year after authorization -0.0002   -0.0088 * -0.0023   -0.0015   
 (0.0006)  (0.0017) (0.0033)  (0.0041)  
  Fifth year after authorization -0.0029   0.0320 * 0.0063   -0.0027   
 (0.0018)  (0.0103) (0.0049)  (0.0062)  
The estimation includes county fixed effects and county-specific quadratic trends, which are not reported here. 
Estimation is performed using Feasible Generalized Least Squares with corrections for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Statistical significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels are indicated by “*” and “†”, 
respectively. Data are annual for 114 Missouri counties covering 1998-2011. 
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Table 2. The Effects of the MQJP on State Employment, 2011 
Significance threshold Own Effects Neighbor Effects Net Effects 
    
Five percent or better 19,613 -44,034 -23,327 
 57 -127 -67 
    
Ten percent or better 36,454 -41,833 -5,379 
 105 -121 -16 
    
Any significance level 27,923 -40,900 -12,978 
 81 -118 -38 
    
The first two sets of calculations use only those coefficients that are statistically 
significant at, respectively, the 5 percent or 10 percent level or better.  The third set 
uses all estimated coefficients, regardless of their statistical significance. For each 
pair of numbers, the top one is the effect in terms of the number of jobs and the 
bottom one is the number of jobs per $1 million of tax credits awarded. 
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Figure 4. The Effect of Tax Credits by Authorization Year, 2011
Years since authorization of tax credits
Note that the calculations include only those effects that are statistically different from zero 
at the 10 percent or better level.
